By Dan Arnold
Within the contemporary, burgeoning discourse on Buddhist inspiration and cognitive technology, premodern Buddhists are often characterised as veritable?mind scientists" whose insights expect glossy examine at the mind and brain. Aiming to complicate this tale, Dan Arnold confronts an important drawback to well known makes an attempt at harmonizing classical Buddhist and sleek clinical suggestion: because so much Indian Buddhists believe that the psychological continuum is uninterrupted by way of dying (its continuity is what Buddhists suggest by?rebirth"), they'd haven't any truck with claims that every little thing concerning the menta. Read more...
summary: within the contemporary, burgeoning discourse on Buddhist suggestion and cognitive technological know-how, premodern Buddhists are often characterised as veritable?mind scientists" whose insights count on sleek examine at the mind and brain. Aiming to complicate this tale, Dan Arnold confronts an important crisis to renowned makes an attempt at harmonizing classical Buddhist and glossy medical proposal: for the reason that so much Indian Buddhists think that the psychological continuum is uninterrupted by means of demise (its continuity is what Buddhists suggest by?rebirth"), they'd haven't any truck with claims that every thing concerning the menta
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Extra resources for Brains, Buddhas, and believing : the problem of intentionality in classical Buddhist and cognitive-scientific philosophy of mind
Thus, as we will see in chapter 4, Dharmakīrti (like Jerry Fodor) is centrally concerned somehow to explain linguistic universals with reference only to particulars; this is the point of his famously elusive apoha (“exclusion”) doctrine. This doctrine elaborates the idea that concepts are more precise or determinate (more contentful) just to the extent that they exclude more from their purview; the scope of cat is narrower than that of mammal just insofar as the former additionally excludes from its range all mammals in the world that are not cats.
Dharmakīrti influentially argued—with his predecessor Dignāga, and as would commonly be held by Buddhists writing subsequently—that only perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) have the status of pramāṇa; all other ways of arriving at knowledge are reducible to one of these criteria. These two kinds of cognition have as their respective objects the only two kinds of things (on one way of dividing up the world) that exist: unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas) and such abstractions or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) as concepts and complex wholes.
These thinkers share, moreover, the idea that the only such particulars that indubitably occur are those that are somehow—Dharmakīrti and Fodor diverge most sharply, of course, with regard to how17—internal to a subject. ” On this view, anything that is called on to explain the causal efficacy of the mind must be intelligible without reference to the semantic properties of mental events—without reference (Fodor says) to “the property of being true, of having referents, or, indeed, the property of being representations of the environment” (1980, 283).